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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
ANGELA ALVARADO, an Infant, by
HORTENCE ALVARADO, her Guardian
Ad Litem,

Plaintiff
and Appellant.
vs.

RONALD TUCKER, and
HAROLD N. TUCKER,

Defendants
and Respondents.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
No. 8043
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the Court below this was a personal injury action
for damages. At the conclusion of the presentation of
testimony offered in support of Plaintiff's Case, upon
motion of Defendants' Counsel for dismissal, the Court
directed the Jury to bring back a verdict of no cause for
action. The Jury complied.
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For the determination of the correctness of the
Court's direction, the resulting verdict, and judgment,
this appeal is brought.
Throughout this brief, "R" is the judgment roll,
"Tr" is the transcript of the proceedings at the trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent issues on this appeal being the question of whether there is anything in the record showing
negligence on the part of the defendants which should
have justified submission to the jury, and whether the
record discloses such negligence on the part of the plaintiff that, as a matter of law, she cannot recover; the
statement of facts are primarily directed to these issues
and but briefly as to non issues of the appeal.
ANGELA ALVARADO, a child 12 years old December 11, 1952, but prior thereto being but 11 years
old (Tr. 7) on March 17, 1952 (Tr. 70) between the
hours of 6 P. M. and a quarter to 7 <R 07, Tr. 34) was
injured by being hit by an automobile (Tr. 33,39) operated by defendant Ronald Tucker on Eccles Avenue between 22nd and 23rd Streets, in Ogden, Weber County,
Utah (R 07). She and four other children had been
playing in the street (Tr. 8) and sidewalk (Tr. 13). She
had waited for a car to go by, then started to walk across
the street and was going from the West side to the East
side when she was struck (Tr. 9). She was hospitalized
and suffered shock, multiple bruises and abrasions of her
shoulders and thighs, bruised hips, fracture of the right
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thigh, and compound fracture of the right lower leg involving both bones (Tr. 49-50). Testimony varied from
its being still light when the child commenced to play
(Tr. 75); to its being dark (Tr. 34) at the time of the
injury; lights on the Tucker car were on <Tr. 32); the
Tucker car was proceeding South on Eccles Avenue <Tr.
25). The speed limit in this location is 25 miles per hour
(Tr. 65). After the accident the child's body was between 10 and IS feet (Tr. 25, 36) from the front of the
Tucker car. The Tucker car was four or five feet east of
the automobile of witness Dorothy W ardleigh, and her
car was parked within six inches of the west curb of
Eccles Avenue (Tr. 39). This witness heard a screech
of brakes, saw car hit a body or an object, saw the body
or object in the air over the top of her car, went out and
saw it was the little girl in the street (Tr. 32, 33). Witness William Glen Norton heard screech of brakes, saw
his sister pushed off the west side of the car, saw where
Angela was laying (Tr. 24, 25). The child did not hear
any brakes before she was hit (Tr. 18). Skid marks were
found running North of where the Tucker car was the
following day by witness W ardleigh, they were black
<Tr. 37). They were paced off by witness A. J. McFarland the following day and were seventeen steps in
length, which he, a retired railroad carpenter, said was
SO feet. <Tr. 43). The witness LeRoy G. Bennett, in
charge of the traffic division of the Ogden City Police
Department (Tr. 57) testified that 51 feet of skid marks,
according to chart used by the department, with 80Yo
coefficient of friction, would show a probable speed of
an automobile as being 35 miles per hour <Tr. 63); the
actual distance traveled where SO feet of skid marks as
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shown, would be about 40 feet, and the chart, using 65%
coefficient of friction, shows, if 46 feet, speed would be
30 miles per hour; at 32 feet, speed would be 25 miles
per hour; so somewhere between 25 and 35 miles per
hour would be the speed of the car dependent upon the
various assumed factors of skid marks and percentage of
coefficient of friction <Tr. 66); that the reaction time of
an individual is three quarters of a second, and 38% feet
is traveled by a car going 35 miles per hour during the
reaction time; <Tr. 64); that the difference in distance
traveled by a car going 25 miles per hour and one going
35 miles per hour, during reaction time, is 11 feet (Tr.
65).
The stipulations of the parties were to the effect that
if the defendant RONALD TUCKER was liable, the defendant HAROLD N. TUCKER, the father, was liable
(Tr. 5, R010); and that $1,316.65 was what could be considered as being the value of services rendered by the hospital, doctor and dentist, obviating testimony with respect
thereto (Tr. 6, ROIO).
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I . There was evidence showing negligence of the
defendants sufficient to warrant and to require the submission thereof to the jury.
2. There was no showing in the record, of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, from which it can be
held, that she cannot, as a matter of law, recover.

ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION I. THERE WAS EVIDENCE SHOW4
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lNG NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION THEREOF
TO THE JURY.
The expressed grounds and reasons underlying the
trial Judge's determination to direct the Jury to bring
back a verdict of no cause for action, are expressed by the
Court, as, it was dark; the children were playing on the
sidewalk; no evidence the driver could have seen the
children outside of his headlights, whether they were high
or low; the child ran from one automobile around directly
from back of that automobile (Tr. 78), fairly appears to
appellant to show the thinking of the trial Judge to be
1. that no evidence is in the record of defendant's negligence, and 2. that the plaintiff was negligent. It is to
this first proposition or point that this brief will now deal.
The theory of the plaintiff, in the trial, on the matter of negligence of defendants is expressed in the opening statement:
"We believe that the evidence will show that at
that time and place the operation of that motor
vehicle was negligent in that the speed of the car
was in excess of the lawful rate of speed for that
location here in Ogden and under the conditions
and circumstances which existed" (Tr. 4).
Supporting this theory on the element of speed, it
was shown that 25 miles per hour was the lawful rate of
speed; that the car laid down black skid marks for SO
feet, and that such evidenced the car as having been
traveling as much as 35 miles per hour, or between 25
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miles per hour and 35 miles per hour, and that the distance a car would travel between the time of observation
of a condition necessitating a stoppage of a vehicle traveling at the rate of 35 miles per hour over that of a vehicle
traveling at the rate of 25 miles per hour is 11 feet, and
showing further that the traveled distance during thereaction time of a car traveling at the rate of 35 miles per
hour is 38.5 feet, while at 25 miles per hour but 27%
feet.
The child was in the center of the street when she
alighted, the defendants' car too was in the center of the
street. It was the child Karen who was pushed off of the
West side of the car, not the plaintiff.
The speed force necessary to hurtle an eleven year
old child through the air, visible by a witness observing
over her own car parked at the curb, and to such a distance that when the car was brought to a stop, even then
there was from 10 to IS feet between the front of the car
and the child lying South of the car, is a factor in the
case.
On the element of conditions and circumstances
which existed, the proof of negligence is, it must be confessed, not overwhelming and free from uncertainty, it
being now seen that from ought that appeared the children had not been in the street for I 5 minutes prior to
the injury, if we take literally the testimony of the child
elicited under cross examination, and close our mind
and judgment as to just how and what children do in
their play, and in tag particularly, and give full credit for
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the ability of the child accurately to judge time, nor was
the familiarity of the driver with this avenue and the
usual custom and habits of the children to the extensive
use of the particular avenue shown, but under this element, the testimony is not without prohibitive value. It
appears that a car parked within 6 inches of the curb,
plus the width of the car, plus a space of 4 or 5 feet, plus
the width of defendants' car was the center of the avenue.
Such is therefore indicative of room for but two traffic
lanes, North and South, which is a narrow space for
operation of a motor vehicle even at the lawful rate of
speed, and at speeds in excess thereof becomes increasingly more dangerous.
The plaintiff did not show, nor seek to show, nor
claim that the lights on defendants' car were not operating. The testimony shows that the lights on defendants' car were operating and further that there was light
from the intersection of the avenue with 23rd Street.
The case with respect to the light conditions are such as
may fairly be drawn from the time element of from 6 P.
M. to a quarter of 7 P. M., the head lights being on, and
the street light being on, the ability of a witness on a
porch on the east side of the street to see his sister pushed
off the west side of the car on the west of the center of
the street, are all factors with respect to the light conditions. To what degree visibility was impaired by the
lightness or darkness of the day on the happening of the
accident is not without uncertainty to be sure, but from
such evidence it is equally true that not all persons would
say that it was so dark, that the drivers of automobiles
could not have seen the children outside of the beam of
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their headlights. However the darker the light conditions, the more serious the excessive speed of the car.
On the matter of defendants' negligence or lack of
it, deducible from the facts in this case, it cannot be said,
we believe, that there is no evidence whatever which supports or would tend to support an allegation of negligence, and that, therefore, and as a matter of law, no
negligence whatever was shown.
The authorities supporting the position of the appellant are as follows:
On the matter of speed of the automobile in relation to speed limit, the texts indicate that some authorities hold that violation of speed limit ordinance constitutes negligence per se, and others hold that it is evidence
of negligence merely. 5 Am. Jur. Automobiles 315, 319.
On the matter of effect of ordinances generally with respect to negligence, the same holdings are found. 38 Am.
Jur. Negligence 168.
See also, 46 A. L. R. 1046 where a collection of cases
show speed ordinance violation to be negligence per se.
Doubtless the best, most reasonable rule, is that
speed in excess of speed limits is but evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, and for its effective application there must need be other facts and circumstances
showing, or from which logical conclusions can be
reached, that the excessive speed contributed to, (it, with
other negligent acts), or was the sole proximate cause of
the accident.
8
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On the matter of Proximate cause see 5 Am. Jur.
Automobiles paragraph 164
Proximate Cause
"The well-established rule of law that in order to
maintain an action for negligence, the injury of
which the plaintiff complains must have been the
natural and probable consequence of a wrongful
act or omission which is not too remote obviously
applies to automobile accidents.

A negligent act cannot be said to be the proximate cause of an accident unless the accident
could have been avoided in the absence thereof.
Speed, in order to be the basis of a recovery for
negligent injuries, must be the proximate cause
of the injuries.

*

*

*

*

The driver of an automobile is also relieved from
liability when the proximate cause of an injury is
the negligence of the person injured, although the
exemption from responsibility in such cases is
usually referred to as being due to the contributory
negligence of the injured person.
When once a chain of events has been started due
to the negligence of the operator of an automobile, he may be held responsible for all mishaps
which are properly the proximate result of his unlawful conduct. The fact that other happenings
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causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the
result so remote that no action can be maintained.
The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character
and in the natural and probable connection between them the wrong done and the injurious
consequence.
In determining what constitutes proximate cause,
the same principles apply where the alleged negligence consists of a violation of a statutory duty as
where it consists of the violation of a non-statutory duty. It is well settled that the violation of a
statute or ordinance, to result in liability for injury to person or property, must be a proximate
cause of such injury."
On the duty owed in regard to children playing in
the street the general text statement with respect thereto is, 5 Am. Jur. Automobiles, paragraph 186.
Children Playing in Street.
"Ordinarily it is the duty of a person operating
an automobile in a street in which there is a
group of children playing, not only to bring his
automobile under control, but to give warning of
his approach and to manage_ his car, keeping in
mind the risk that children may not exercise the
care for their own protection that adults are expected to exercise. The question of liability for
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injury to a child, for example, playing ball in the
street, is not subject to any hard and fast rule.
There is a reciprocal duty on the part of the
driver and the child. Upon the driver there rests
the duty, after discovering the presence of the
child, to proceed with that degree of care that a
careful man would exercise when faced with such
a situation."
PROPOSITION II. THERE WAS NO SHOWING IN
THE RECORD OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
THE PLAINTIFF FROM WHICH IT CAN BE HELD
THAT SHE CANNOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, RECOVER.
The source of any showing in the record on the
question of claimed negligence on the part of the plaintiff comes, if at all, is from the testimony of the plaintiff herself, of Hortense Alvarado, her mother, and from
the testimony of William Glen Norton.
Reviewing the evidence of these three, successively,
which constitute the ingredients out of which must arise
the resolution that plaintiff was irrefutably negligent, or
that plaintiff was irrefutably not negligent, or that the
facts could support a decision either way, the following is
shown:
ANGELA ALVARADO, a child 11 years and 3
months, in the fourth grade in school, playing back in
the street (Tr. 8) with four other children (Tr. 8) about
Six Thirty or so (Tr. 9) we was just playing back outside, and I saw a car that was going to stop, and then, I
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waited for him to go by, and then I went around it and
then I started to walk across the street, and then I don't
remember (Tr. 9).
A series of leading questions were propounded on
cross examination tending to elicit responses to show
Angela to have been playing tag along the side of the
street on the sidewalk with four other children chasing
each other, after supper, after dark, showing however
also that they had been running across the street before
the accident but not for about fifteen minutes before, and
placing Angela as playing, running up and down the east
sidewalk just before she ran out into the street, she and
the other injured child being chased by her brother, not
remembering which way they were running before she
ran out across the street, then running along the side of
one car next to the sidewalk and running behind the car
and running thence across the street again without looking to see if there were any cars coming from the other
direction, with the other child ahead of her getting past
the car Ronald was driving before she, Karen, got hit.
WILLIAM GLEN NORTON
A 17-year-old boy, testifying that about Six Thirty
Angela, among other children, were playing in the street,
including his sister Karen. He saw his sister pushed off
of the car.
HORTENSE ALVARADO
She permitted the child to play outside that day, she
did not see the accident, she had let the child out pretty

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

close to six o'clock and it was still light; she customarily
let Angela play until about eight o'clock; Angela had been
told from time to time to stay out of the street; she didn't
know the child was playing in the street that night; however she knew that the children liked to play out in the
street, the neighbor children too, for it was the only place
they could play ball, and lots of times they would skate
on their roller skates out in the street.
From this and other similar testimony must the
question of negligence-no negligence-or uncertainty as
to which, must a decision be made.
If, from such testimony, it can be said that as a matter of law Angela was negligent, then the decision of the
trial Judge is unassailable, but if, from such testimony it
can be said that Angela was not negligent, or that reasonable persons might differ as to whether Angela's actions were negligent or not, then the matter is one for the
jury and the action of the trial Judge a usurpation of the
jury functions.
The law and citations applicable to the ascertainment of the correctness or error of the trial Judge, are as
follows:
In the case of Nelson et ux. v. Arrowhead Freight
Lines, Limited. Smith et ux. v. same, 104 P 2d 225, the
court says this with respect to persons 16 years of age:
"-such a person is presumed to possess that discretion and physical capacity consistent with the
safe use of the highways, and as setting an age at

13
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and above which the presumption of adult respon-.
sibility attaches.
emphasis added.
Further in this same case the court states:
"Between the ages of seven and fourteen, in the
absence of showing to the contrary, an infant is
generally assumed not to have the same consciousness of danger and the same judgment in avoiding
it as an adult."
emphasis added.
This case quotes with approval an excerpt from
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Volume 1, Section 99
(a)'

"The question as to whether a child's capacity is
such that it may be chargeable with contributory
negligence is a question of fact for the jury, unless
so young and immature as to require the court to
judicially know that it could not contribute to its
own injury or be responsible for its acts, or so old
and mature that the court must know that, though
an infant, yet it is responsible. Where the infant
is under fourteen years of age, the burden rests
upon the defendant to rebut the legal presumption
of incapability of contributory negligence. As to
those over fourteen years of age the prima facie
capability of ·negligence attaches. Each case must
depend upon the intelligence and capacity of the
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child and the surrounding facts rather than upon
any arbitrary rule. It cannot be said on the one
hand that a child just past seven years is sui juris
so as to be charged with negligence, nor, on the
other hand, that a child just under that age is
wholly incapable of exercising care.
It has generally been held that, since there is no
exact period fixed by law at which there is no
doubt as to whether the child is sui juris, the question of intelligence and ability to exercise care is
for the jury under proper instructions from the
court. But it has ben held that, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, a child fourteen years of
age is presumed to have sufficient capacity to be
sensible of danger and to have the power to avoid
1•t •"
The crossing of a street at a place other than at a
pedestrian lane, by even an adult, has been held to be a
jury question, and denial of a motion for a directed verdict sought by the defendant, was not error. Morton v.
Hood, 143 P 2d 434.
The withdrawal or withholding of a case from the
jury where the evidence is conflicting, but where evidence does exist which would sustain a jury's determination, whatever that jury might determine, appears to be
improper, 53 Am. Jur. Trial, paragraph 299.
Possibility of Different Conclusions.
"A case cannot properly be withdrawn from the
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jury simply because, in the judgment of the court,
there is a preponderance of evidence. A cause
should never be withdrawn from the jury unless
it appears, as matter of law, that a recovery cannot be had upon any view of the facts which the
evidence reasonably tends to establish. Where
there is an issue of fact upon which reasonable
minds might disagree, the court is not justified in
withdrawing the case from the jury. If there is
conflicting evidence, and any view that the jury
might lawfully take of it will sustain their findings for either party, the facts should not be withdrawn from them."

. CONCLUSION
The facts and circumstances, is our sincere belief
and contention, show the negligence of the defendants;
the reversible error of the trial Judge in directing a verdict of no cause for action; and the error of failing to sub-·
mit the case to the Jury for its determination of the question of whether the evidence in their judgment showed
the defendants to have been negligent or not.
And, further, that there is no showing in the record
of chargeable negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and
none from which it can be held the plaintiff cannot, as
a matter of law, recover.
In consequence, and for the reasons expressed herein, the Judgment and Verdict herein should be vacated
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and set aside; the directions of the trial Judge reversed;
and a new trial ordered.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID K. HOLTHER,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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